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CONCERNING ADOPTION AND ADOPTED PERSONS AS
HEIRS IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. J. White Hutton*
On May 17th, 1937 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rendered an epochal
decision in Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 258, 192 A. 460, 27 D. & C. 646. The inspir-

ation for the present discussion arises from that decision and the lucid opinion
of Stern, J., in which the entire court concurred. On June 10th, 1937, a motion
for rehearing was denied. Consequently the question decided may be taken as
settled, dispelling doubts engendered by prior cases, particularly that of Reamer's
Estate, 315 Pa. 148, 172 A. 655.

Since the effective date of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1937, P.L. 429,
20 PS sec. 102, the present writer has held to the view now expounded in Cave's
Estate, supra, concerning the right of the adopted person to inherit from collateral kindred of the adopting parents and has so taught in the class room.
Hence the present decision is a matter of gratification, although during the apparent interregnum of Reamer's Estate, supra, the view became clouded by reason
of the dictum expressed, howbeit Per Curiam, in the Reamer Case. As illustrative of the student attitude critical of the latter case the reader is referred to
an article entitled "Adoption as Affecting Inheritance in Pennsylvania," by
Jesse P. Long, which is found in 39 Dickinson Law Review 179 (1935). With
these preliminary observations, let us consider this startling departure from the
beaten paths of inheritance law.
DEFINITION

In I R.C.L. 592 .(1914) it is explained:

"The act of adoption fixes a status, and it has been defined to be
the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized
as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. Another definition is 'the taking into one's family the child of another
as son and heir, and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such'."

*A.B., Gettysburg College, 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; LL.B., Harvard University,
1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1902; Member of Pennsylvania House
of Representatives, 1931-1935. Author of Hutton on Wills in Pennsylvania.
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THEORY

As set forth in the definitions just quoted, adoption, by whatever proce~s
wrought, creates a status recognizable by the law, of which further trite instances
are the status created by marriage and by the commercial contract of partnership. In each instance the individuals are, as it were, lifted out of a former
condition into one entirely different, recognizable by the law as such, and in
which status a different set of laws is applicable from that of the former condition. The late Professor James Parsons in his erudite treatise on Partnership
Law maintained stoutly that the discordant principles of partnership law could
only be reconciled by the application of this status theory. As to what particular
rules of law are to be applied to the new status of adoption that is another question. The point at present made is that the adopted person in law becomes a
different person. If any one doubts that the law does so work upon the imagination, let him recall the familiar example of corporate entity where the legal
imagination has run riot, asseverating that as many as 40,000 individuals may
be one person in the eyes of the law and in turn this fictitious person becomes
a citizen of the United States.
The adoption theory, although stated repeatedly in the cases to be a concept
unknown to our common law ancestors, (see Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 A.
1038,) was known to the ancients of Greece and Rome and to other ancient
peoples and was practiced among many continental nations under the civil law
from remotest antiquity. 1 R. C.L. 593. Furthermore, the custom of adoption
was followed by the American Indians and was observed by the performance of
either of two rites, (1) that of baptism, (2) by transfusion of blood. It may
be of interest to recite at some length an instance of a baptismal ceremony, where
the adopted person was a white man, who by the way, has recently been reincarnated as the hero in an historical novel, "The First Rebel."
Let Col.
James Smith explain the ceremony of his adoption into the Delaware Tribe
after his capture near Fort Duquesne in 1755. He recounts his experience in
"Our Western Border," p. 76, where after describing his capture, there is this
graphic recital:
"As I at that time knew nothing of their mode of adoption an,l
had seen them put to death all they had taken, and as I never could
find that they saved a man alive at Braddock's defeat, I made no
doubt but they were about putting me to death in some cruel manner. The old chief, holding me by the hand, made a long speech,
very loud, and when he had done, he handed me to three young
squaws who led me by the hand down the bank, into the river, until the water was up to our middle. The squaws then made signs
to me to plunge myself into the water, but I did not understand
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them- I thought that the result of the council was, that I should ba
drowned, and that these young ladies were to be the executioners.
They all three laid violent hold on me, and I for some time opposed
them with all my might, which occasioned loud laughter by the multitude that were on the bank of the river. At length one of the
squaws made out to speak a little English, (for I believe they began to be afraid of me,) and said no hurt you; on this I gave
myself up to their ladyships, who were as good as their word; for
though they plunged me under the water, and washed and rubbed
me severely, yet I could not say they hurt me much.
"These young women then led me up to the council house,
where some of the tribe were ready with new clothes for me. They
gave me a new ruffled shirt, which I put on; also a pair of leggins
done off with ribbons and beads; likewise a pair of moccasins, and
garters dressed with beads, porcupine quills, and red hair-also a
tinsel laced cappo. They again painted my head and face with
various colors, and tied a bunch of red feathers to one of those locks
they had left on the crown of my head, which stood up five or six
inches. They seated me on a bearskin, and gave me a pipe, tomahawk, and polecat-skin pouch, which had been skinned pocket
fashion, and contained tobacco, killikinnick, or dry sumach leaves,
which they mix with their tobacco-also spunk, flint and steel.
When I was thus seated, the Indians came in dressed and painted
in their grandest manner. As they came in they took their seats,
and for a considerable time there was a profound silence- every
one was smoking- but not a word was spoken among them.
"At length one of the chiefs made a speech, which was delivered to me by an interpreter, and was as followeth: 'My son, you
are now flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone. By the ceremony
which was performed this day, every drop of white blood was washed out of your veins; you are taken into the Caughnewaga nation,
and initiated into a warlike tribe; you are adopted into a great family,
and now received with great seriousness and solemnity in the room
and place of a great man. After what has passed this day, you are
now one of us by an old strong law and custom. My son, you have
nothing to fear; we are now under the same obligations to love,
support and defend you, that we are to love and defend one another;
therefore, you are to consider yourself as one of our people.' At
this time I did not believe this fine speech, especially that of the
white blood being washed out of me; but since that time I have
found that there was much sincerity in said speech,- for, from that
day, I never knew them to make any distinction between me and
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themselves in any respect whatever until I left them. If they had
plenty of clothing I had plenty; if we were scarce, we all shared
one fate."
That the colonists of Pennsylvania were familiar with these practices among
Indians is quite clear, not only from the instance just recited but from the noted
Mary Jamison case and other remarkable experiences occurring at the old Carlisle
Barracks following the Treaty with the Indians at Fort Stanwix. Nevertheless,
it has been stated that no common law of adoption prevails in Pennsylvania.
Said Potter, J., in Carroll's Estate, supra:
"The only methods of adoption of children known to the law of
Pennsylvania, are those prescribed by the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L.
430, sec. 7, as re-enacted by the Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. 125,
sec. 1, and the Act of April 2, 1872, P. L. 31, sec. 2. The former

provides for adoption by petition to, and decree of, the court of
common pleas; and the latter for adoption by deed duly executed
and recorded. While the act of 1872 refers to 'the common-law
form of adopting a child by deed,' yet the authorities are uniform
to the effect that adoption was unknown to the common law, whether
by deed or otherwise: Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358; McCully's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 80; Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297; Butterfield
v. Sawyer, 187 II. 598. We know of no authority for the proposition that, in the state of Pennsylvania, a child may be adopted by
parol. The doctrine of Peterxon's Estate, 212 Pa. 453, does not
justify any such conclusion. In that case, the adoption was not in
parol, nor was there any effort to show that it was; it was under
the petition of both the husband and wife, and the decree of the
court."
STATUTORY GENESIS

The present law in Pennsylvania on the process of adoption, I PS Sec. 1,
is the Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127, Sec. 1, -as amended by the Act of April
26, 1929, P. L. 822, as follows:
"It shall be lawful for any adult citizen of this Commonwealth residing therein, desirous of adopting any person, either a minor or an
adult, as his or her heir or as one of his or her heirs, to present his
or her petition to the orphans' court, or to a law judge thereof, of
the county where he or she may be resident, or of the county in
which the person to be adopted is a resident, declaring such desire
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and that he or she will perform all the duties of a parent to such
person. Such petition shall also set forth the name, age, date, and
place of birth of the person proposed to be adopted; the name, residence, and marital status of the adopting parent or parents; the name
and place of residence of each of the natural parents or of the surviving parent or of any other person whose consent to the proposed
adoption is necessary as hereinafter provided, and shall embody or
have attached thereto the consents in writing of the person or persons whose consent to the proposed adoption is necessary as hereinafter provided."
In Thompson's Adoption, 290 Pa. 586 (1927) 139 A. 737, in a petition
for adoption presented to the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, the fact3
were that the petitioners, citizens of Pennsylvania, resided in Allegheny County.
The minor was born on April 13, 1926, in Armstrong County, and resided there
with his mother, grandmother and step-grandfather at the time of the adoption proceedings. The parents of this child and also his grandmother joined in the petition for his adoption, and the minor himself was present in court at the time of
the hearing thereon. After this hearing, on consideration of the testimony there
taken, the court below found that the welfare of the child would be promoted
by allowing the adoption, but refused the petition on the ground that, since the
minor was a resident of Armstrong County, the courts of Allegheny County had
no jurisdiction.
In reversing the decree and remitting the record to the court below with
a procedendo, Moschzisker, C. J., observed, inter alia:
"The subject of adoption has always been in the hands of the legislature. There was no such thing as adoption in the English common

law (Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358, 362; 1 C. J. 1371; Brown's
Adoption, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 259, 262; Evan's Est., 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 196, 198), and, prior to 1855, we had no general statute
in Pennsylvania providing for such procedure: Ballard v. Ward,

supra; Carroll's Est., 219 Pa. 440, 444; Brown's Adoption, supra;
Evan's Est., supra. Up to 1855, adoptions were legalized in particular cases by special acts of assembly: See, for example, Act of
March 15, 1847, P. L. 388, enacting 'That (X) and (Y) his wife,
be authorized to change the name of (A.B.) . . . . and by that
name (A.B.) shall have and enjoy all the rights, benefits and advantages of a child born in lawful wedlock of the . . . . said (X)
and (Y)'; see also the Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 685. While the
Act of 1855 provided for adoptions in general (McQuiston's App.,
238 Pa. 304, 310), it did not name the courts of common pleas to
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exercise that jurisdiction; it simply said that it should be lawful to
present petitions for adoption to 'such court' in the county where the
person desiring to make the adoption 'may be resident,' and no mention of the common pleas, to which the words 'such court' can properly be referred in connection with the subject of adoptions, appears
in the statute, either before or after that phrase. We, however,
construed 'such court' to mean the courts of common pleas (Ballard
v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358, 362), probably because those tribunals were
at that time the only courts throughout the State of recognized general, as distinguished from special, jurisdiction .

. .

. Our legis-

lature, by the Act of 1925, has recently seen fit to confer the jurisdiction in question on the orphans' court, and we find nothing in
this statute to render it unconstitutional."
Despite the statement in the aforegoing quotations concerning the common
law, which may be interpreted as referring to the common law of England and
not the common law of Pennsylvania, nevertheless the General Assembly of
the Commonwealth in the Act of April 2, 1872, P. L. 31, being a supplement
to the 7th Section of the original Adoption Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430,
provided as follows:
"That in all cases heretofore, as well as hereafter, when the common
law form of adopting a child by deed has been practiced or done,
it shall be lawful, on proof of due execution of the deed, to have
the same recorded in the proper office for the recording of deeds,
in the county where the adopting parent resides at the date of its
execution; and a duly certified copy thereof shall be received in evidence, with the same force and effect as the record of adoption would
have in the mode provided in the act to which this is a supplement."
Both the Act of 1872 and the section 7 of the Act of 1855, supra, were
repealed by the Adoption Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127. Whether the socalled common law adoption by deed may still be considered as the law of Pennsylvania is at least questionable in view of the aforegoing authorities. Moreover the broad view of inheritance rights as interpreted in Cave's Estate, supra,
would call for a confinement of adoption procedure to that directed in the Act
of 1925. Therefore, the Orphans' Court is the jurisdictional tribunal and "any
adult citizen of this Commonwealth" may adopt "any person, either a minor
or an adult, as his or her heir or as one of his or her heirs," and by the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1925 the adoption decree as made directs "that
the person proposed to be adopted shall have all the rights of a child and heir
of such adopting parent or parents, and be subject to the duties of such child."
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Section 7 of the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430, provided, inter alia, "that
it shall be lawful for any person desirous of adopting any child as his or her
heir, or as one of his or her heirs, to present his or her petition to such court in
the county where he or she may be resident." Consequently under these provisions an adult could not be adopted and where this was desired a special act
of assembly had to be procured. The Pamphlet Laws contain many instances of
legislative action, see for particular examples the Pamphlet Laws of 1872, pages
1046, 1250, 1251 and 1252.
The Constitution of 1838 did not forbid special legislation, but Article
III Section 7 of the present Constitution provides "the general assembly shall
not pass any local or such law," inter alia, "authorizing the adoption or the
legitimation of children."
The Act of 1855, as quoted, did not lay so much stress upon the residence
of the petitioner, although requiring that such petitioner was to present the petition to such court in the county "where he or she may be resident."
In Brown's Adoption, 25 Pa. Superior Court 259, Rice, P. J., after quoting
the language of the Act of 1855, reasoned:
"Hence, it has been authoritatively decided in this state that the
word 'resident' as used in the. act of 1855 includes both permanent
and temporary residence in the commonwealth."
As will be noted in the Act of 1925, supra, the petitioner, unless presenting
the petition to the court of the county where the person to be adopted resides,
must present the petition to the court of the county where he resides as a citizen
of Pennsylvania, thus emphasizing citizenship, a permanent matter, as well as
residence which may be temporary.
To sum up the differences in this aspect between the acts of 1855 and 1925,
they are (1) a change of the court from common pleas to orphans' court, (2)
allowing adoption of an adult, and (3) laying stress upon the status of the petitioner as a citizen of Pennsylvania.
It was held in McQuiston's Adoption, 238 Pa. 304, 86 A. 205, that the
Act of 1855 did not preclude the right of the petitioner to file an adoption
petition in the county where the child resided. As already stated the Act of 1925
expressly so permits.
METHODS OF ADOPTION

Prior to the Act of 1925 the three methods of adoption were (1) by petition to the common pleas court, (2) by deed of adoption, according to the Act
of 1872, and (3) by special legislative enactment prior to the first Monday of
Januuary, 1874, when the present Constitution went into effect.
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As the Act of 1872 has been repealed by the Act of 1925 and the present
Constitution proscribes special legislation, on matters of adoption, this would
leave remaining as the sole method that by petition which now is addressed to
the orphans' court instead of the common pleas court. As already stated it is
doubtful whether the so-called common law method of adoption by deed, as
mentioned in the Act of 1872, prevails since the repeal of that act, although
upon studying the cases so frequently cited to support the statement that no common
law plans of adoption exist in Pennsylvania will be found to contain merely
obiter dicta on this point. Moreover, it must be remembered that there are still
many cases of adoption now existing in Pennsylvania which must be supported
as valid acts of adoption according to the law as it existed prior to the passage
of the Act of 1925. In this connection the case of Evan's Estate, 47 Pa. Superior
Court 196, may be cited for the proposition that an adoption by deed according
to the Act of 1872 is not complete until the deed is recorded.
PROCEDURE

Sections 3 and 4 of the Adoption Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127, 1 PS,
provide as follows:
"Section 3.
"Upon presentation of any such petition as aforesaid a time for
hearing thereon shall be fixed not less than ten days from said presentation, which said hearing may be before the said court or any
law judge thereof at chambers, and may be adjourned from time
to time if the nature of the case should so require. At said hearing
the adopting parents or parent, the person proposed to be adopted,
and all the persons whose consent is necessary hereunder must appear in person and be examined under oath by such court or judge,
but the personal appearance of the natural parents or other persons
whose consent is necessary hereunder may be dispensed within the
discretion of the court or judge hearing the petition, if such persons
reside without the jurisdiction of the court, or if for any other reason
the said court or judge deem it unnecessary, provided the duly executed
consents of such persons in writing have been filed with the petition;
and the said court or judge may in his discretion require the personal
appearance of the natural parents of the child at a different time and
separate and apart from that of the other parties in interest. The
said court or judge shall also hear any other testimony as to the facts
:. forth i. ".e petition or necessary to inform the court as to the
desirability of the proposed adoption, and may also make or cause
to be made an investigation by some person or agency specifically
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designated by said court or judge to verify the statements of the petition and such other facts as will give the court full knowledge as
to the desirability of the proposed adoption.
"Section 4.
"If satisfied that the statements made in the petition are true, and
that the welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will be promoted by such adoption, and that all the requirements of this act
have been complied with, the court or judge shall make a decree
so finding and reciting the facts at length, and directing that the
person proposed to be adopted shall have all the rights of a child
and heir of such adopting parent or parents, and be subject to the
duties of such child; but otherwise shall make a decree refusing the
adoption and dismissing the petition. If desired by the parties the
decree may also provide that the person adopted shall assume the
name of the adopting parent or parents. Such decree shall be filed
and spread at length upon the records of said court and shall be
sufficient evidence of the adoption and shall be open to the public.
All other papers pertaining to the case and the testimony if written
out shall be kept in the. files of said court as a permanent record
thereof and may in the discretion of said court or judge be withheld
from inspection, by a proper order, in which case no person shall
be allowed access thereto, except upon an order of court granted
upon cause shown."
In Appeal of Weinbach, 316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500, it was held that the
review of an adoption case would lie with the Supreme Court rather than the
Superior Court except where the adoption proceeding appealed from was in the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia which has jurisdiction in adoption matters, and
in which instance the appeal would be to the Superior Court under its exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals from the Municipal Court, citing McCann's Adoption,
104 Pa. Superior Court 196, 159 A. 334. On the question of the right of
appeal in adoption cases, Schaffer, J., said':
"The next question for consideration is whether there is any right
of appeal in this class of cases. Adoption is a purely statutory
proceeding. There was no such thing as adoption known to the
common law. Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358; Thompson's Adoption,
290 Pa. 586, 139 A. 737. The Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127, as
amended by Act of April 26, 1929, P. L. 822, section 1 (1 PS section 1), regulating adoption does not provide for an appeal, and
therefore the scope of our review is that exercisable on certiorari,
Lewis' Appeal, 6 Sad. 79, 10 A. 126; Von Moss' Election, 219 Pa.
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453, 68 A. 1019; Young's Adoption, 259 Pa. 573, 103 A. 344.
Consequently, the only matters to be inquired into are whether the
court below exceeded its jurisdiction or its proper legal discretion.
Robb's Nomination, 188 Pa. 212, 41 A. 477; Sterrett v. MacLean,
293 Pa. 557, 143 A. 189; Yancoski's Appeal, 313 Pa. 461, 169 A.
762. In reviewing the court's decision, under the provisions of the
Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, section 1 (12 PS section 1165),
we take into consideration the evidence which, according to the
terms of the statute, is brought up by the writ of certiorari 'with
like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon the
verdict of a jury in an action at law.' This requires us to examine
the testimony to determine whether there is any evidence to sustain
the findings of fact. In re Plains Township Election Returns, 280
Pa. 520, 124 A. 678; Walker's Appeal, 294 Pa. 385, 144 A. 288;
Bangor Electric Company's Petition, 295 Pa. 228, 145 A. 128."
AS HEIR

The right of an adopted person to take as heir in Pennsylvania depends upon
the intestate laws. This is particularly so under our present Constitution which
provides in Article III Section 3 that no bill, except general appropriation bills,
shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Consequently, the adoption act of 1925, together with its
amendment of 1929, does not cover the right of an adopted person to take
as heir.
Under the Constitution of 1838 this requirement did not exist and hence
the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430- the first act of assembly in Pennsylvania
upon the subject of adoption- is entitled "An Act relating to certain duties and
rights of husband and wife, and parents and children."
Section 7 of the Act of

1855

reads as follows:

"That it shall be lawful for any person desirous of adopting any
child as his or her heir, or as one of his or her heirs, to present his
or her petition to such court in the county where he or she may be
resident, declaring such desire, and that he or she will perform all
the duties of a parent to such child; and such court, if satisfied
that the welfare of such child will be promoted by such adoption,
may, with the consent of the parents or surviving parent of such
child, or if none, of the next friend of such child, or of the guardians or overseers of the poor, or of such charitable institution as
shall have supported such child for at least one year, decree that
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such child shall assume the name of the adopting parent, and have
all the rights of a child and heir of such adopting parent, and be
subject to the duties of such child, of which the record of the court
shall be sufficient evidence: Provided, That if such adopting parent
shall have other children, the adopted shall share the inheritance
only as one of them in case of intestacy, and he, she or they shall
respectively inherit from and through each other, as if all had been
the lawful children of the same parent."
The Intestate Act of April 8, 1833, P.L. 315, "an Act relating to the descent
and distribution of the estates of intestates," was based entirely upon the descent and distribution of the estates of such intestates to blood relatives and to
the spouses, hence the provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1855 are to be
considered as an engraftment upon an entirely different theory. Consequently,
the section has been construed strictly and the courts did not allow its terms
to be extended any farther than the language would permit. The adopted person was clearly made an heir of the adopting parent and in case of the death
of the latter, intestate, would take such estate just as a blood relative under
the Intestate Act of 1833 or a share thereof along with the blood children of
the intestate. In lohnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346, a testamentary trust was created
and the remainder disposed of as follows: "And upon and immediately after
the death of my son, to assign, grant and convey the said real estate to such
person or persons, and for such estate or estates, and in such proportions as
would, by the intestate laws of this Commonwealth, be entitled to the same
if he had died intestate seised thereof in fee." After the death of the testatrix
the son adopted a child under the provisions of the Act of 1855 and later died
leaving this adopted child but no issue. It was held that the adopted child
was entitled to the estate. Said Gordon, J.:
"One of two things may be regarded as reasonably certain in this
case: either Mrs. Johnson did know and understand the intestate
laws, to which she so distinctly and emphatically refers, and so must
have known that her son had the power to introduce into the succession one not of her blood, or she was indifferent as to what
might become of the residue of her estate after her son's death,
and therefore intrusted the disposition thereof to those laws, without caring to inform herself particularly concerning their provisions.
In the one case, she acted in view of the possible occurrence of
what has happened, acid in the other, she cared not what the result
might be; in either case, nothing remains but to give her words
their legal and reasonable meaning and force, and thus invest the
appellant with the title and possession of the property which rightfully belongs to her."
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The phraseology of the section, inter alia, is that the adopted person "shall
have all the rights of a child and heir of such adopting parent." This same
phrase appears in the Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 168, and was interpreted in
Webb's Estate, 250 Pa. 179, as investing the adopted child with the right to
become the heir at law of the adopting parent and with this investment goes the
right of succession in the legal heirs of such adopted child so that in case such
child is not living at -the death of the adopting parent, his or her heirs would
succeed, as he or she would have done if living.
On the other hand the section was singularly remiss in not creating reciprocal rights of inheritance between the adopting parent and the adopted child
whereby the former would take the estate of the latter dying intestate, unmarried and without issue. Therefore, in Commonwealth v. Powel, 16 W.N.C.

297, it was held that the natural parents of a child adopted under the provisions of the Act of 1855 are entitled to the child's estate in preference to
the adopting parents where such child dies intestate, unmarried and without
issue. The simple reason assigned for such a ruling was that the act did not
provide for the parent by adoption inheriting from the adopted child, and a
reading of the section discloses this fact.
The proviso of Section 7 of the Act of 1855 takes care of the situation
where the adopting parent has natural children by specifying "the adopted
shall share the inheritance only as one of them in case of intestacy, and he,
she or they shall respectively inherit from and through each other, as if all
had been the lawful children of the same parent." This has been interpreted
as meaning that there are reciprocal rights between the persons just mentioned
confined, however, to the estate as inherited from the adopting parent. The
play therefore is upon the words "from and through each other" but confined
to the estate as inherited. Consequently, in Burnett's Estate, 219 Pa. 599, interpreting the later Act of April 13, 1887, P. L. 53, it was held that an adopted
child of a deceased brother could not claim a share as the representative of his
adopting parent in the estate of another brother who died intestate leaving to
survive him one brother, one sister and the children of a deceased brother.
The law applying was section 3 of the Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 315, together with the Acts of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430, April 13, 1887, P. L. 53
and May 19, 1887, P. L. 125.
In order to provide for the casus omissus pointed out in Commonwealth v.

Powel, supra, the Act of April 13, 1887, P. L. 53, specified as follows:
"That whenever hereafter any child, adopted according to law, shall
die intestate and without issue, in the distribution and division of
any personal or real estate of such child, the adopting parents, and
their lawful heirs and kindred, shall be treated and shall inherit
from such adopted child, according to the intestate laws of this
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Commonwealth, the same as though such adopted child were the
natural child and heir at law of such adopting parents, to the exclusion of the natural parents, kindred and heirs at law of such
adopted child, reserving to the husband or wife of such adopted
child all his or her respective rights, under the said intestate laws:
and, in case either or both such adopting parents shall die intestate,
said adopted child shall inherit the property of said parent or parents, the same as though the said adopted child were the lawful
child and heir at law of said adopting parents: Provided however,
that this act shall only apply to such property, as the adopted child
shall have inherited or derived from the adopting parents, or
their kindred."
Further statutes providing for situations in the adoption of adults, not
embraced in the Act of 1855, are as follows: Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 168;
Act of April 22, 1905, P. L. 297; Act of June 1, 1911, P. L. 539. These
statutes are cited in order to afford a full review, but they do not advance the
matter beyond the statutes already discussed. A like observation may be made
concerning the Act of May 28, 1915, P. L. 580.
Thus stood the statutes of this Commonwealth prior to the effective date
of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, 20 PS Section 102, and the
law may be summarized as providing for the adoption of both minors and
adult persons and the conferring upon the adopting parents and their heirs
and the adopted persons and their heirs reciprocal rights of inheritance and also
extending similar rights of inheritance respectively to the adopted person and
his heirs and the natural children of the adopting parent and their heirs, providing, however, that in the latter cases these reciprocal rights of inheritance
"from and through each other" were confined to the estate that was inherited
from the adopting parent. Section 16 of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917,
P. L. 429, 20 PS, provides, inter alia, as follows:
"(a) Any minor or adult person adopted according to law and the
adopting parent or parents shall, respectively, inherit and take
by devolution from and through each other personal estate as next
of kin and real estate as heirs, under the provisions of this act,
as fully as if the person adopted had been born a lawful child of
the adopting parent or parents.

"(b) The person adopted shall, for all purposes of inheritance
and taking by devolution, be a member of the family of the adopting parent or parents. The adoptive relatives of the person adopted
shall be entitled to inherit and take from and through such person

to the exclusion of his or her natural parents, grandparents and
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collateral relatives, but the surviving spouse of such adopted person
and the children and descendants of such adopted person shall have
all his, her and their respective rights under this act. Adopted
persons shall not be entitled to inherit or take from or through their
natural parents, grandparents or collateral relatives, but each adopted
person shall have all his or her rights under this act in the estates
of his or her spouse, children and descendants."
In the report of the Commission to codify and revise the law of Deccdents' Estates submitted to the General Assembly of 1917, the Commissioners
stated:
"So far as concerns our recommendations for substantive changes
in the law, we have endeavored to be conservative, and yet have
not hesitated to suggest important changes where we thought them
distinctly beneficial. It has been often said, and with truth, that
the burden of proof is upon him who advocates a change in the
law, and this rule is distinctly applicable to that department of
the law which has been referred to us. For the law of decedents'
estates in this Commonwealth is and has been for many years, certainly since the Revised Acts drafted by the Commissioners of
1830, most admirable in its theory, and in practice most satisfactory
to the community. We have therefore been careful to limit our
recommendations to those changes, which we felt after our careful
deliberations and unanimous conclusions would meet with the approval of the representatives of our fellow citizens, and deserve a
practical trial."
In Thomas's Estate, 2 D. & C. 89, Judge Hughes of the Orphans' Court
of Washington County, in an able opinion discussed and applied the law as set

forth in Sec. 16, supra. He first traced the various acts of assembly relative
to adoption, already cited in this present article, whereupon the learned judge
explained:
"Upon a consummation of an adoption under any of these statutes, certain mutual, fixed and present rights, duties and liabilities
automatically attach to the immediate parties to such new relationship; the adopting parent gaining thereby all the rights of a natural
parent, such as the custody, control, services and earnings of the
adopted child, while the adopted person becomes thereby entitled to
all the vested rights of a natural child, such as a home, support,
clothing, medication and education. Such are the mutual and vested
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rights and obligations which attach and become fixed concurrently
with the completion of an adoption, but another important right
(so-called) accrues as an incident to such adoption, such right, however, being purely inchoate in character, to wit, the right of inheritance; such right being created and existing to the extent defined
by the succeeding adoption statutes.
"The Intestate Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 315, having been enacted

many years before adoption was permitted in Pennsylvania, it, of
course, contains no provisions relative to inheritance incidental to
adoptions. While the Act of April 13, 1887, P. L. 53, amending the
Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430, is devoted exclusively to the subjectmatter of inheritance under adoptions, each of the other adoption
statutes cited covers not only the circumstances and conditions upon
which adoptions will be permitted thereunder and the procedure to
be followed to obtain the desired decree, but also defines the inheritance to follow the adoption perfected under such act. The legislature of 1917 saw fit to divorce the matter of inheritance under
adoption from the said adoption statutes and to cover such matter
of adoption inheritance exclusively within the new inheritance act
of that year. Consequently, the subject-matter of inheritance following
adoptions of minors, as well as of adults, has been made a part of, and
incorporated in, the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, as section
16 thereof; while all of the said adoption acts then existing were thereby repealed so far (and only) as they related to inheritance. This Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, in express language provides
that it shall take effect on Dec. 31, 1917, and shall apply to estates, real
and personal, of all persons dying intestate on or after said date; section
28 specifying that the act 'is intended as an entire and complete system for the descent and distribution of the estates, real and personal,
of persons dying intestate' on and after such date, and concluding
with a general repealer of all other acts of assembly or parts thereof
in any way in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the said
Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, or any part thereof."
In this case A adopted B, aged 16 years, in 1907. B later married and
died in 1918 intestate, survived by his adopting parent, A, his widow, C, and
one child, D. A died in 1920 testate as to a portion of her estate but intestate
as to the residue which was the greater portion, leaving to survive no spouse or
natural child or issue but C and D and certain collateral relatives consisting
of nieces and nephews, children of deceased brothers and sisters. In the adjudication of the account of the personal representative of A's estate the orphans'
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court awarded the residue going under the Intestate Law to C as the heir of
B, the deceased adopted child of A. Judge Hughes has written an opinion
sustaining this holding and covers in a most comprehensive way the import and
breadth of Section 16, supra, and particularly clause (a) which contains the
applicable provisions. Said the learned judge:
" . ....

Upon scrutinizing clause (a), it is observed that its
provisions are devoted exclusively to the inheritance rights of the two
immediate parties to the adoption, no attempt being therein made to
cover the inheritance rights of persons other than such immediate
parties, such as the latter's natural or adoptive heirs or kindred.
Now, upon centering our attention on the word 'from', it is perceived that it contemplates and can be applicable and operative only
in the event of the death of one or the other of such immedia.e
parties to the adoption, the statute giving the survivor of such immediate parties the right to inherit and take by devolution 'from'
the other, the deceased party. The effect of the word 'through' is
farther reaching, extending the inheritance rights of both of the
immediate parties so that each of them is thereby qualified to inherit, not merely from the other immediate party, but also from the
latter's relatives and kindred, through the channel left open by the
latter's death; it being observed that such word 'through' likewise
presupposes the death of such original party, leaving the other party
surviving; and it being further remembered that clause (b) of said
section limits such 'relatives and kindred' of the adopted person to
the latter's children and descendants. Now, in clause (b) of the
section under consideration we find expressed the converse of the said
provisions of clause (a), to wit, clause (b) giving the adoptive
relatives of the person adopted, i. e., the natural relatives and kindred of the adopting parent, the right to inherit and take not only
'from' the adopted person himself, but also from his children and
descendants, 'through' the channel left vacant by the death of such
adopted person. Thus it is seen that the statute has thrown open
both gates of the channel of adoptive inheritance, permitting not only
adopting parents, but also their kindred (without any limitation whatsoever and irrespective of degree of relationship), to inherit and
take not only from the adopted person, but also from his children
and descendants. Now, it must be admitted that the statute does
not expressly provide for or authorize reverse inheritance in such
line of persons, to wit, inheritance by the children and descendants
of the adopted person from the adopting parent and from the latter's kindred, but such reverse or reciprocal inheritance, is necessarily
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implied. We have seen that under clause (a) the adopting parent
himself, and under clause (b) the relations and kindred of such
adopting parent, are qualified to inherit from the adopting person
and also from his children and descendants 'through' him. What
possible reason could the legislature have had to deny reciprocal or
reverse inheritance rights to such children and descendants of the
adopted person? No reason can be conceived, and we conclude,
therefore, that the legislature did not so intend to withhold from
the children and descendants of an adopted person inheritance rights
reciprocal to those vested by the act in express language in the kindred of the adopting parent....
"Accordingly, we conclude that the statute impliedly vests such
reciprocal rights of inheritance in the children and descendants of
the adopted person, permitting them to inherit, not only from the
adopting parent, but also from the latter's natural relatives, 'through'
the gates of the channel of inheritance left open by the deaths of
the original adopting and adopted persons."
It is not expedient in this article to quote at further length from this most
excellent opinion but the reader is referred to it as one of the best discussions
on the scope and legal effect of Section 16, supra, as will be found in our
reports. The decision is correct and the whole case may properly stand for the
proposition that under Section 16 (a) the inheritance rights of the adopted person and the adopting parent or parents are reciprocal and carry under the theory
of- succession these same rights to the heirs of the adopted person and the
adopting parent or parents as they may be determined under the general intestate laws of the Commonwealth. The ruling in Webb's Estate,. 250 Pa. 179,
supra, is followed. It is believed, however, that if the learned court had directly
applied the adoption theory, as outlined in the present article, and had held
that the trend of inheritance legislation in Pennsylvania culminates in Section
16 of the Intestate Act as the carrying out of this theory, then in the language
of the codifying commission there would be emphasized "important changes
where we thought them distinctly beneficial."
To restate the matter, by the process of adoption the status of the adopted
person and of the adopting parents is changed and under the theory of the
law the latter become the actual parents of the former. The previous identity
is completely lost in the new relationship or as expressed by the Indian chief
in the adoption of Col. Smith: "My son, you are now flesh of our flesh, and
bone of our bone." Facing the reality of the situation as presented by our
adoption statutes, this is actually the change that takes place by operation of
law. True, the inheritance statutes have lagged behind in the carrying out
of this theory and according to the changed relationship all of the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto. However, as we trace the development in these
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statutes in Pennsylvania, we do find a continuous progression until finally, as
has already been stated, the theory is carried out in its entirety in Section 16
of the Intestate Act of 1917.
As held in Thomas's Estate, supra, the issue of the deceased adopted child
takes a share in the estate of the adopting parent who dies intestate in just
the same way that those of the actual blood would take. This principle applies
lineally to the remotest degrees in accordance with the general rule of inheritance in the Intestate Act of 1917. Conversely, not only will living adopting
parents inherit from deceased adopted children where by the general laws of
inheritance they would be entitled to take, but in the ascending line grandparents and descendants of grandparents would likewise take shares in the estate
of the deceased adopted child when by law such classes were entitled to inherit.
Moreover, the status of the adopted person being established, he cannot reap
any advantages by virtue of his former position. Under the adoption Act of
1887, it was held in Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81, that where a grandfather
adopted a grandchild, daughter of a deceased daughter, and later died intestate,
the adopted grandchild inherited as a child of the adopting parent who was also
the blood grandfather and not in a double capacity as child and grandchild.
Let us now consider particularly the provisions of Section 16 (b), supra,
and the cases in which this paragraph has been construed.
In Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 A. 319, the question was considered
by Simpson, J., as to whether the provisions of Section 16 (b) of the Intestate
Act would extend to a will wherein there were gifts to a brother, sister, nephew,
and niece if the legatee predeceased the testator leaving no issue, the Wills Act
of 1917 making no specific provision for such a situation. The decree of the
court below holding that such legacies lapsed was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Concerning the course of legislation it was said:
"Instead of passing a general act, giving to adopted children all the
rights of those who are natural-born, the legislature has chosen,
as has been shown above, to advance step by step, and we cannot
properly do otherwise than follow where it leads; hence, since the
supposed rights of an adopted child have not been extended to
cover the situation here presented, we can only repeat what we said in
Boyd's Est., 270 Pa. 504, 507; 'If it is deemed wise to provide
that adopted children shall have the rights here claimed for them,
the legislature can extend the law to cover them; we cannot.' "
In Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675, a testatrix devised certain real
estate to four sisters, a brother and her own adopted daughter. The testatrix died
in 1913. One of her sisters died in 1914 unmarried and without issue; another
sister, a widow without issue, died in 1925, and another sister, a widow, died in
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1929 leaving two children surviving. The brother died also in 1929 unmarried
and without issue. The fourth sister and the adopted daughter of the testatrix
remained at the time of the present litigation which was a proceeding for a declaratory judgment to determine the proper construction of the will of the testatrix in
regard to the amount and nature of the interests given to the six devisees. In
passing upon this question and in referring to the opinion of the lower court,
Moschzisker, C. J., observed:
"We agree with the court below that, 'upon the death (in 1914)
of C. Gertrude Mays, a sister (of testatrix), unmarried and without
issue, her undivided . . . share . . . in said real estate descended to
her (three) surviving sisters and brother, and (the) adopted child of
S. Anice Cryan'; that, 'upon the death (in 1925) of Ella A. Beck
(sister of testatrix), a widow without issue, her undivided . . . share
• . . descended to her (two) surviving sisters and brother and to
Minnie C. Wineman, the adopted child of ... S. Anice Cryan; that,
'upon the death (in January 1929) of Martha Jane Creswell (sister
of testatrix) a widow, leaving to survive her two children, namely,
Ella C. Wagner and Annie C. Turner, the respondents, her undivided . . . share . . . descended to her said two children in equal
shares'; that, 'upon the death (in May 1929) of John Mays (brother
of testatrix), unmarried and without issue, his undivided . . . share
...
descended to his sister, Mary Hall, to Minnie C. Wineman, the
adopted daughter of S. Anice Cryan, and to Ella C. Wagner and
Annie C. Turner, the children and heirs of Martha Jane Creswell,
deceased.'"
Continuing the learned Chief Justice thus concluded:
"It remains to say only that the original devisees enjoyed vested
estates in the real property here involved; several of them
(as hereinbefore recited) died intestate, after the testatrix, and, under
section 16 (b) of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, 439
(20 PS paragraph 102) appellant, being an adopted child of the
original decedent, and, because of this position, viewed in law as
a niece of those devisees who died without issue (see Russell's Estate,
284 Pa. 164, 166-168, 130 A. 319,) inherited a portion of their respective shares. These facts and the statute last cited must be taken
into consideration to understand the correctness of the judgment
entered in this case.
"The judgment of the court below, so far as it determines the interest
of the present owners of the property in controversy to be 'Minnie
C. Wineman, one-third, Mary E. Hall, one-third, Annie Creswell
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Turner, one-sixth, and Ella Creswell Turner, one-sixth,' and that
they hold in fee as tenants in common, is affirmed, costs to be
divided pro rata according to the shares just stated."
In this case the estate as taken by the respective devisees and under the ruling
of the court was all derived from the testatrix and could therefore be considered
as coming "from and through" the testatrix. Nevertheless, the remarks of the
court and the results of the ruling in holding that the adopted child inherited
as niece a portion of the vested shares of testatrix's brother and sisters dying intestate and without issue after the testatrix, appeared to justify the broad interpretation of section 16 (b) as entitling the adopted child to take a portion of the
estate left by collateral adoptive relatives.
However, the assurances so engendered, either with or without justifiable
reason, were in the course of time dispelled by an obiter dictum in Reamer's'
Estate, 315 Pa. 148, 172 A. 655. A petition was filed with the Register of Wills

of Bedford County seeking the revocation of a prior grant of letters of administration on the estate of Mary Kerns Reamer, deceased, and the appointment of the
petitioner as administrator in place of the original appointee. The Register dismissed the petition and upon appeal the orphans' court sustained the action of
the Register, whereupon the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. The decedent in question had died intestate and her next of kin of the blood relationship
were first cousins. She was also survived by an adopted daughter of a deceased
sister, but the adopted one was not of the blood of the, decedent. The Register
of Wills upon the nomination of the first cousins appointed an administrator and
the adopted child of the decedent's deceased sister later nominated the petitioner
to the office of administrator. In a Per Curiam opinion the court affirmed the order
of the court below and stated that the only question involved was, does the adopted
daughter of a deceased sister, not herself of the blood of decedent, inherit a portion
of the decedent's estate, in preference to first cousins who are of that blood?
The court then stated that it agreed with the court below in answering this question
in the negative. In the following quotation appears the position of the court
on the matter of the rights of inheritance of adopted children:
"This controversy seems to be a perennial one. Over and over
again we have been unsuccessfully urged to decide that adopted
children, merely by reason of their adoption, acquired a right to
share in the estates of deceased relatives of the predeceased adopting
parent, but all such attempts have met with failure. Section 16 (a)
of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, 439 (20 PS paragraph
161), because of which, if at all, an adopted child's claim must be
established, provides as follows: 'Any minor or adult person adopted
according to law, and the adopting parent or parents shall, re-
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spectively, inherit and take, by devolution from and through each
other, personal estate as next of kin, and real estate as heirs, under
the provisions of this act, as fully as if the person adopted had
been born a lawful child of the adopting parent or parents.'
Despite the care and skill evidenced by the brief of appellant's
counsel, there is nothing new in the argument now presented to us.
We repeat what we have always heretofore said, that the estate which
an adopted child is entitled to have is limited by the statute, to one
which comes 'from and through' the adopting parent, and that an
estate in which the latter never had any interest cannot possibly go
to the adopted child, since it cannot be derived 'from' or 'through' the
adopting parent. As the rights of the adopted child and the adopting
parent are reciprocal, under the section of the statute quoted, it
necessarily follows, if appellant's contention is correct, that, if
either dies, the survivor will take, at no matter what lapse of time,
whatever the other would have taken, if living, irrespective of the
source from which the estate comes."
Two points of criticism may be made on the result of this case and the reasoning
to support such result. (1) The question for determination was not as to the
right of the adopted daughter of a deceased sister to inherit but was whether
the action of the Register in granting letters to the nominee of a blood relative
over the nominee of the adopted child of the deceased sister of the decedent was
proper. And (2) that the phrase in all of the inheritance laws in Pennsylvania pertaining to adoption including the provisions of section 16 wherein the words
"from and through" are used, does not have reference to the estate which passes
from or through but does refer to the right of inheritance which may pass
"from and through" the particular person.
As to the first point of criticism it may be said that as the right of administration is fundamentally based upon the right of participation ir the estate to be
administered, if the first cousins were not entitled to take they would hardly be
entitled to the letters, and conversely if they were entitled to take they would
obviously be entitled to the letters. However another turn to the problem revolves around the point as to whether the Fiduciaries Act, which contains
the specifications as to rights of administration which govern the register of
wills, contains terms broad enough to justify the register in passing of blood
relatives and selecting adopted persons although the latter might actually be
entitled to the estate in question. The answer to this particular problem is
beyond the scope of the present article but the writer believes that the present law
is broad enough to justify the register of wills in appointing as administrator the
adopted child or his issue who inherit from the decedent in, question rather than
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blood relatives who either do not inherit or participate along with the adoptive relatives.
As to the second point of criticism, the remarks bear internal evidence of
rather hasty consideration and certainly do not represent the law of the present
concerning the rights of adoptive relatives to take in the estates of collateral adoptive relatives.
If Reamer's Estate is to be supported, it must rest upon the narrow position
that the register of wills acted properly in refusing to consider the petition in
question rather than on the broad position assumed by the court in determining
the heritable qualities of the adopted child of the deceased sister of the decedent.
CAVE'S ESTATE

This case is the last utterance of our Supreme Court on the question of
the proper interpretation of section 16 of the Intestate Act of 1917. The question
involved arose in the adjudication by the orphans' court of Philadelphia County of
the account of the administrator of W. Lewis Cave, deceased, and the distribution
of the balance appearing upon said account. The decedent died September 21,
1935 intestate, unmarried and without issue, and was survived by four nephews
and by Jean Cave, adopted daughter of another nephew, Warren F. Cave, who had
died before the decedent. Jean Cave when adopted in 1922 was two years of
age and the decree of the court provided that she should "assume the name of
Warren F. Cave and Mary R., his wife, and have all the rights of a child and
heir of the said Warren F. Cave and Mary R., his wife, and be subject to the
duties of such child." Jean Cave presented her claim to participate in the estate
of the decedent but the court below rejected her claim and ordered distribution
among the four nephews. The guardian of Jean Cave appealed and the question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether under the facts Jean Cave was
entitled to inherit a fifth part of the decedent's estate.
In an opinion by Stern, J., approved by the entire court, this question was
answered in the affirmative and the decree of the lower court was reversed and a
distribution ordered in accordance with the opinion of the court. After stating the
facts in the question involved and citing the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L.
429, Section 9 (d), 20 PS Section 65, providing that in default of issue, parents,
brothers and sisters, the property of an intestate who leaves nephews and nieces
shall be divided among them per capita and "each child of a deceased nephew
or niece . . . shall receive an equal portion of the share which his or her

parent would have received if living at the death of the intestate", as being the
appropriate provision of the law if the adopted child of a deceased nephew
should come within this provision, the learned justice remarked:
"The right of adopted children to inherit from kindred of their adoptive parents is dependent entirely upon statutory enactments, and

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

because the 'call of the blood' is one of the most firmly rooted instincts of human nature, courts tend to a strict construction of such
legislation. In the absence of a plain legislative mandate to the
contrary, a stranger to the adoption proceedings should not have his
property diverted from its natural course of descent to the heirs of his
blood; therefore, a statutory grant to adopted children of the right to
inherit from their foster parent does not necessarily carry with it
the right to inherit from the latter's collateral relatives. However, it
must be conceded to be within the legislative power to confer
such a right upon an adopted child, and the problem in the present
case is to ascertain whether the statutory law of the state is properly
to be construed as having granted it."
After a discussion of the statutes already referred to in this article and also
the cases of Russell's Estate, Cryan's Estate and Reamer's Estate, supra, the learned

justice observed:
"Such being the somewhat confused state of judicial expression in
regard to this subject, we have no hesitancy now in deciding, apart
from any binding authority to be ascribed to the decision in Cryan's
Estate, that the Intestate Act of 1917 permits of no reasonable construction other than that, by its terms, an adopted child has the
same right of inheritance from the collateral kindred of his adoptive
parents as a natural child of such parents would have. The court
below apparently relied upon the statement in Reamer's Estate that
an adopted child is not entitled to inherit an estate in which his
adoptive parent never had a vested interest. Such a construction of
section 16 of the Intestate Act (20 P.S. Sections 101, 102) is wholly

By the use of both words-'from'
untenable .........
and 'through'-it is clear the Legislature intended that the adopted
child should have the right to inherit not only property in which his
adoptive parent himself owtned a vested interest, but property of
kindred of his adoptive parent which the latter would have inherited
had he been living, and which, by reason of his death, passes 'through'
him to his adopted child as it would have done, to use the language
of section 16 (a), 20 P.S. section 101, 'if the person adopted had
been born a lawful child of the adopting parent or parents.'
"The language of clause (a) of section 16 (20 P.S. section 101) is
greatly strengthened and emphasized by that of clause (b), 20 P.S.
section 102. Nothing could be more sweeping than the provisions: 'The person adopted shall, for all purposes of inheritance and
taking by devolution, be a member of the family of the adopting parent
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or parents. .

.

. Adopted persons shall not be entitled to inherit or

take from or through their natural parents, grandparents, or collateral relatives.' This severs the child from his natural family tree
and engrafts him upon that of his new parentage 'for all purposes of
inheritance.' The evident purpose of this legislation is lost by the
interpretation given to the act by the court below."
Thus after the passage of twenty years from the enactment of Section 16 of
the Intestate Act of 1917, it has received an authoritative and final interpretation
in accord with the broad and sweeping terms of its language and free from the
sophistry so apparent in the dictum of Reamer's Estate.
The interpretation as made carries into full effect the plain language of
the section and coupled with the interpretation of Judge Hughes in Thomas's Estate,
supra, the effect of the section is made clear indeed.
BY WILL

In Webb's Estate, supra, Stewart, J., referred to the right of the parent to
do with the property he possessed as he or she saw fit and that it was only when
the parent's dominion over the property is terminated by death that anybody succeeds to such property rights. This obviously applies not only to natural parenti
and natural children but also to adoptive parents and adopted children as well.
Therefore the provisions of law already discussed have application only to situations
of intestacy or where there is a will wherein the terms of the intestate law arc
adopted as in Johnson's Appeal, supra. On the other hand whether an adopted
person comes within the terms of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, 20
PS Section 181, depends upon the language of the particular sections. Section 16,
20 P.S.isections 227 and 228, provide as follows:
"(a) Whenever in any will a bequest or devise shall be made to
the child or children, of the testator, without naming such child or
children, such bequest or devise shall be construed to include any
adopted child or children ,of the testator, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will.
"(b) Whenever in any will a bequest or devise shall be made to the
child or children of any person other than the testator, without
naming such child or children, such bequest or devise shall be construed to include any adopted child or children of such other person
who were adopted before the date of the will, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will."
These provisions changed the rule applied in Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, to
the effect that an adopted child could not take under a devise to the adopting parent
for life and after her death to her child.
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It was also held in Goldstein v. Hammell, 236 Pa. 305, that the adoption
of a child after making a will did not avoid the will as to such child and this
ruling was followed in Boyd's Estate, 270 Pa. 504, wherein it was held that the
Wills Act of 1917 did not change this ruling. However, section 21 of the Wills
Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, as amended by the Act of May 20, 1921, P.
L. 937, section 1, 20 P.S. section 273, now reads as follows:
"When any person, male or female, shall make a last will and testament, and afterward shall marry, or shall have a child or children,
either by birth or by adoption, not provided for in such will, and
shall die leaving a surviving spouse and such child or children, or either
a surviving spouse or such child or children, although such child
or children be born after the death of their father, every such person,
so far as shall regard the surviving spouse or child or children born
or adopted after the making of the will, shall be deemed and construed to die intestate; and such surviving spouse, child, or children
shall be entitled to such purparts, shares, and dividends of the estate,
real and personal, of the deceased, as if such person had actually
died without any will."
On the other hand in Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 A. 319, where under
section 15 (b) of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 413, 20 PS 252, providing
that where a testator did not leave any lineal descendants who would receive the
benefit of any lapsed or void devise or legacy, a legacy to a predeceasing niece
should not lapse if she left issue surviving the testator, it was held that an
adopted child of the niece was not to be considered as such issue and further in
such a case the adopted child could not take such devise or legacy under the provisions of section 16 (b) of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, 20
PS section 101.
TRANSFER INHERITANCE TAX

In Thomas's Estate, supra, Judge Hughes stated:
"Counsel for the petitioner, in contending that the right of inheritance given by the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, to an
adopted person is purely personal to such adopted person and not
transmissible by succession to such adopted person's descendants lays
great stress on the decisions in those reported cases which hold that
an adoption does not make the adopted person in fact a child of the
adopting parent, nor cause such adopted child to lose its true
identity in the eyes of the law. The case of Reel's Estate, 50 Pitts. L. I.
128 (1902), cited by counsel for the petitioner in this connection, has
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been overruled in effect by the decision in Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81
(1915). In the other cases so cited by such counsel in this connection, Com. v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 389 (1859); Thorp v. Com., 58
Pa. 500 (1868), it was held (and the Adult Act of May 9, 1889, P. L.
168, expressly provides) that the shares obtained by adopted persons
from decedents' estates through inheritance or under testamentary
disposition should be subject to the payment of collateral inheritance
tax. It cannot be denied that such, indeed, was the inheritance tax law
under such decisions and under said statute, and that such continued
to be the law until, by section 16 of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917,
P. L. 429, adopted persons, so far as inheritance and devolution are
concerned, were placed on a parity with natural children. In this connection it should be observed that the Legislature of 1917, which en.
acted the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917 P. L. 429, also enacted the
Transfer Inheritance Act of July 11, 1917, P. L. 832 ,wherein adopted
children are classed no longer along with coilaterals, but are placed in
the same group with, and taxable as, lineals, and in this later classification they are carried into the Acts of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521, and the
amendment of the latter, approved May 4, 1921, P. L. 341. This
change in the classification of adopted persons is another manifestation of the fixed determination of the lawmakers to abolish as to
inheritances all distinction previously existing between adopted and
natural children."
However, in Herner's Estate, 19 D. & C. 563, decided in 1933, it was held
that the Act of May 15, 1925, P. L. 806, 20 PS section 2302, in the use of
the term "adopted children", referred only to those adopted by the decedent himself, and that others in the lineal line receiving a legacy or share of an estate, although through the channels of adoption, would have to bear the rate of 10%
instead of 2%. This case is out of harmony with the trend of the decisions outlined in this article and can be supported only on the peculiar reading of the statute.
Chambersburg, Pa.

A. J. White Hutton

